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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we describe the unique security issues involved in 
healthcare domains. These have been addressed to the needs of the 
HealthAgents project. In the proposed approach, several levels of 
security have been provided in accordance with Software 
Engineering principles, ethical regulations for healthcare data, as 
well as the security requirements usually raised from the distributed 
clinical settings. The result is the production of a secure and 
maintainable Multi-Agent System that enables secure 
communication, uniform home site authentication, and customised 
resource access authorisation. A security policy rule scheme has 
been designed for agent interaction modelling. This separates the 
functional and non-functional (security) requirements but let 
security policy constraints integrate into the running of the agents 
via a unified role notion. Each user/agent can play a function role 
only when its assigned social rights roles permit the access to 
resources of various types and geographical locations, as specified 
in the function role behaviour. The approach is illustrated using a 
comprehensive secure access case.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2 [Software Engineering]; J.3 [Life and Medical Sciences]: 
Health, Medical information systems; K.6.5 [Management of 
Computing and Information Systems]: Security and Protection  
General Terms: Design, Security, Languages 
Keywords 
Security Model, Healthcare, Distributed Decision Support System 
1.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Assisting medical diagnosis has been one of the main goals of 
Software Engineering (SE) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) [6]. One 
approach, the use of them together as a decision support system 
(DSS), is of particular interest. A successful medical DSS would 
aim to improve the healthcare outcomes required by an individual 
clinician. The process of designing such a system requires not only 
consideration of the clinician’s needs but also access to data and 
processes that may be geographically distributed, and at the same 
time ensure interaction with other healthcare professionals [7]. 
Access to patient data, for example, is complicated further by the 
patients’ healthcare records. A patient can have multiple visits to 
multiple medical centres for different conditions. This requires that 
data is shared between a distributed set of hospitals without recourse 
to a centralised system, i.e. an agreed protocol. The protocol is 
employed as part of the distributed decision support system (d-DSS) 
which increases the autonomous interaction between the medical 
centres. This interaction requires not only that data is not lost, but 
that the technology is trust worthy and secure [5]. Patient privacy 
and safety are in danger in any system application if the appropriate 
technological practices are not in place. 
These different attributes to providing a medical d-DSS, that is 
distributed, bring challenges to security for data and services access 
that are transmitted over insecure transportation networks amongst 
hospitals. Challenges also lie in the access policy management and 
application since each centre needs to maintain its own control over 
its own resources. Moreover, the access to private patient records 
must be in compliance to legal and ethical regulations as set in 
countries where centres are located. All resources and services 
provided by the system should be protected accordingly to 
guarantee that decision making support for healthcare diagnosis can 
be executed as it ought to be. 
Several existing Software Engineering technologies have been 
identified as qualified candidates to meet one perspective or another 
of the multi-facets security needs in d-DSS: Multi-Agent System, 
Certificate and Public Key Infrastructure, Role-Based Access 
Control model, and so on. This research investigates the best 
practice of building a secure d-DSS with the available SE 
techniques in our HealthAgents project [10] in line with the SE 
disciplines and healthcare guidelines. 
The rest of the section gives background for security in Software 
Engineering, the legal and ethical guidelines of security in 
healthcare, as well as selected approaches in the area. Section 2 
provides an overview of our HealthAgents project and its system 
architecture. Section 3 describes the architecture’s conformance to 
the data protection regulations. Section 4 analyses the 
HealthAgents’s security requirements and describes several cases 
where security must be enabled in resource access messaging flow. 
Section 5 offers an overview of the proposed solution, followed by 
detailed discussion of its secure transportation, authentication 
mechanism, and authorisation mechanism which is illustrated using 
a representative secure resource access case. Finally, we conclude in 
Section 6 by describing the security achievements of the proposed 
d-DSS from various aspects and our future work.  
1.1  Security in Software Engineering 
Correctness, maintainability, and security are among the key issues 
under consideration when the Software Requirements Specification 
(SRS) of a software system is to be documented describing the 
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 system’s intended functionality and attributes, according to the 
IEEE standard 830-1998 [1]. Unlike functional requirements which 
describe the system’s expected behaviour, maintainability and 
security are quality requirements which describe the manner in 
which the system behaves. The security attribute of software can 
serve as the requirement of protecting the software from accidental 
or malicious access, use, modification, destruction, or disclosure [1]. 
The maintainability attribute of software can serve as the 
requirement to ensure the ease of maintenance, enhancement, 
adaptation, or correction of software to satisfy the specified 
requirements. Requirements originating from security and 
maintainability may significantly direct or restrict the design. These 
quality requirements are described in the Software Quality 
Knowledge Area (KA) as part of the Guide to the Software 
Engineering Body of Knowledge (SWEBOK) [2]. It serves a 
baseline on a core body of knowledge on Software Engineering 
established by the IEEE Computer Society and the ACM.  
The distinct software quality attributes abstracted according to KA 
demand careful study prior to software development. Security, for 
example, is interrelated with functionality as well as maintainability. 
This complexity has to be addressed before a good security-enabled 
software design can be achieved. The normal business functional 
requirements and non-functional requirements of security require 
the software to be maintainable, in terms of both the required 
functionality and the identified security constraints. On one hand, 
these requirements should be separated rather than intermixed, for 
improving maintainability or modifiability [1] and supporting 
continuous software evolution. This separation implies the 
maintenance of security requirements should be in a separate 
process from the maintenance of functionality. This principle 
accords with the idea of separation of concerns. On the other hand, 
the security issue has an impact over the overall system and, this 
again, presides over its functionality. Moreover, secure access 
control is a key aspect of the management of configuration items in 
software configuration [2], supporting software to function properly. 
Thus, separately maintained functional and non-functional 
requirements need at some point to be merged and integrated. 
Therefore, functionality and security requirements need to be 
maintainable, separately, and at the same time, the maintenance 
needs to reflect the effects of security-related change to the 
functionality. In doing so, the software system under development 
will be functional, secure, and maintainable.  
1.2  Laws and Regulations  
The UK Data Protection Act 1998 came into force in 2000. It 
regulates the processing of data of individuals, including the 
obtaining, holding, use or disclosure of such information. The data 
protection principles are as follow. 
1 Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully (and under certain conditions).  
2 Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, 
and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those 
purposes.  
3 Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose 
or purposes for which they are processed.  
4 Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.  
5 Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than 
is necessary for that purpose or those purposes.  
6 Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under 
this Act.  
7 Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised 
or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or 
damage to, personal data.  
8 Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the European 
Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection 
for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data.  
1.3  Existing Software Engineering Approaches 
to Security in Healthcare  
In the last subsections, the paper reviewed the general SE principles 
for building secure systems and related ethical data protection 
regulations. Taking these into account, it is believed that security 
must be engineered into a system from the starting point to achieve 
pluggable and maintainable security policies technically and, in 
addition, provide a lawful approach for data access and transfer. A 
software system may have its functionality and usability negatively 
compromised if security is to be added or fixed after its 
implementation. It is our intention to build a separate yet integrative 
security sub-system within the overall software design, being a 
target of direct maintenance and at the same time the result of 
changes immediately being reflected in the whole system. This will 
alleviate the burden of post-implementation development phases 
where, both high cost of maintenance throughout code and 
limitation of testing are considerable barriers to achieving security.  
The agent technology is promising in both the building of a d-DSS 
for healthcare and ensuring its security. On one hand, agents have 
the capabilities for representing different services required by the 
system, providing the backbone to ensure the distribution of data, 
and offering intelligent answers to the demands of the users. On the 
other hand, their abstraction of different processes where resources 
are accessed can be under the security control if appropriate 
measures are imposed upon them. Several approaches that employ 
agents in healthcare domains for providing security have been 
investigated.  
The concept of heuristic security agents has been introduced in a 
scheme [5], in which all calls are intercepted to files, networks, 
library modules and components, as well as other resources. They 
are checked against behavioural rules before an “allow” or “deny” 
decision is made, preventing the entire classes of attacks to 
healthcare information systems. 
Security concern has also been focused upon the private patient 
information sharing among interconnected hospitals. Secure access 
of electronic healthcare records (EHR) which may be scattered 
across healthcare units has been considered in [3]. A scheme is 
proposed that employs a security agent per site which authenticates 
users and controls the access to the local resources by looking at the 
user roles. The dedication of an agent for the full security control of 
each site suffices for the protection of a simple resource type of 
patient records from a single point of access. However this approach 
will expose its insufficiency when 1) multiple resource types are 
available each corresponding to a responsible party in an 
individual’s site and 2) in addition attempting to share some 
common services amongst multiple sites and 3) at the same time 
ensure the differentiated access privileges of each user.  
Another approach to the similar problem of exchanging private 
patient records among distributed hospitals introduces a four-tier 
architecture, a central access control (CAC) system and multiple 
local access control (LAC) systems sitting between the client 
application and hospital information systems [4]. CAC and LAC are 
Multi-Agent Systems which use authentication agents, encryption 
agents, and access control agents. Multiple LACs enable hospital 
managers to maintain their distinct access control policies over 
patient records. The single CAC serves as a communication hub 
establishing secure communication network with each LAC so that data access requests can be forwarded amongst LACs and actual 
data can be passed amongst them in a secure manner. In this 
architecture, the security level is determined by the weakest LAC 
and the central CAC may impose a performance bottleneck and a 
single point of failure to the entire system. 
All the above methods introduce agents or multi-agent systems 
explicitly for the purpose of access control, security not being 
considered as part of an integrated software design by software 
engineers in the first place. It has been shown in the Agent.Hospital 
framework [8] that it is feasible and beneficial to employ MAS as 
well as ontology technology for modelling and integrating existing 
individualised healthcare processes towards distributed decision 
making processes with improved assistance for enabling diagnosis 
and subsequent treatment plans for cancer patients. The addition of 
security-specific agents will impose extra designs for existing 
healthcare system implementation and requires a runtime 
communication overhead and in addition the maintenance of the 
security components. Our hypothesis is that, a Multi-Agent System 
will be most effective in securing a healthcare information system if 
its participant agents serve core clinical business functions with 
associated security measures or policies applicable by the agents as 
behavioural constraints before their performance of normal 
functioning behaviour in the clinical setting. In doing so, 
functionality and security are integrated into a single architecture 
but security policies can be separately maintained, hence improving 
the software design and the resultant application. 
2.  THE HEALTHAGENTS PROJECT 
2.1  Project Overview 
The HealthAgents system is a distributed DSS that supports 
diagnosis and prognosis, employs a set of distributed nodes that 
either store patient case data, build classifiers that are trained upon 
case data and capable of classifying tumour types, or use classifiers 
for the diagnosis and prognosis of brain tumours. The magnetic 
resonance spectroscopy (MRS) data used by the system is built up 
using anonymous information from child and adult cases. Classifiers 
are created by the producer nodes that receive requests from the 
clinicians to generate classifiers for particular tumours. Clinicians 
with cases will employ classifiers to assist in the diagnosis of 
patients for particular tumours. The HealthAgents system consists of 
a variety of agents each charged with a different task. In the real 
world, the main sites will be located at the University of 
Birmingham with 50 different contributing centres, at the 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona with 6 centres, and at the 
Universitat de Valencia with 4 centres. 
2.2  Key Components and Architecture 
Figure 1 shows a prototype version of the HealthAgents d-DSS. 
Each clinical node, as part of the inter-networked system, can be 
either a user where requests for classification of a given case are 
delivered, or the producers where classifiers are created or retrained 
based on pattern recognition techniques, or both. In any case, they 
all contribute their data for the training of classifiers. New classifiers 
may be produced or existing ones improved when new case sets 
become available, due to the growth of data in existing centres or 
new centre participation. When a clinical user requests the 
classification of a case that resides internally, its associated GUI 
Agent will retrieve the patient data from the local hospital database 
via a Database Agent, local data access policies being applicable. 
 
Figure 1. The distributed architecture of the HealthAgents 
system and its resource access flow control. 
Alternatively, if the case under classification resides externally, then 
the GUI Agent will contact the local Yellow Pages Agent, which in 
turn will contact an external Yellow Pages Agent through which 
patient data is retrieved via the Database Agent of that hospital, 
external data access policies being applicable. One Yellow Pages 
Agent resides in each hospital’s local node. They synchronise with 
each other and together maintain a directory of available nodes, 
agents, as well as the classifiers for the entire HealthAgents 
network. Their knowledge of the availability and location of 
resources is useful for answering queries sent from the GUI Agent. 
Global resource and service access policies will apply when 1) 
cross-centre resource access is requested by an agent, and 2) global 
services such as the query service provided by the Yellow Pages 
Agent are requested.  
Once the case has been loaded into the GUI application, it may be 
classified. The local Yellow Pages Agent has registered in it 
classifiers that can discriminate among tumour classes, including 
descriptions about their capabilities, reputation, and the training data 
upon which they have been produced. The clinician may send 
various questions about the patient’s condition including details 
about the tumour state being aggressive or non-aggressive, the type 
of cancer, to the Yellow Pages Agent to solve. The Yellow Pages 
Agent looks up its local registry, contacts external Yellow Pages 
Agents, and compiles a list of appropriate classifiers. This list is 
returned to the clinician and the clinician can now send the selected 
classifiers which can solve questions, accompanied by the patient 
data that these classifiers can operate upon, to the Classifier 
Petitioner Agent. The Classifier Petitioner Agent will invoke each 
Classifier Agent associated with the classifiers in the list, supplying 
to it the patient data. Internal or external classifier access policies 
will apply, depending upon the location of classifiers. While this 
may involve remote classifier access which gives the system a sense 
of full distribution, in practice, once a classifier is produced a copy 
might be obtained by every node in the network for local classifier 
running and better performance.  After the execution of classifiers, classification results are collected 
by the Classifier Petitioner Agent from multiple classifiers and 
ranked using statistical data and finally sent back to the clinician. 
The clinician can now do the diagnosis, supported by the answers 
and recommendations provided by the system. Eventually, when the 
diagnosis is finished, the clinician evaluates the classification result 
produced by the selected classifiers and their reputation updated. 
The above scenario assumes that classifiers exist to solve the 
questions. If no such classifier exists, a clinician requests the 
Training Petitioner Agent to create one using data from distributed 
sites and register the new classifier in the Yellow Pages Agent for 
later use.  
3.  REGULATION CONFORMANCE  
3.1  Anonymisation and Transference  
While complete patient records may be accessed only by hospitals 
and local nodes, link-anonymised records may be exchanged 
between a limited number of centres producing classifiers. The term 
link-anonymised data refers to data from which personal 
information (e.g. name, address, date of birth) is removed but to 
which a unique patient identifier is added, preserving patient 
anonymity but allowing data traceability and maintainability. 
Furthermore, only limited amounts of data which can be considered 
as totally anonymised may be accessed outside the closed project 
network. 
Such a scheme constrains the form in which data can be exchanged 
in the system and the common use of link-anonymised data protects 
patient privacy. In addition, the direct use of patient case records no 
matter what forms they may take is largely minimised, and 
substituted by the use of classifiers that are produced upon cases for 
decision making. This offers a further level of protection to private 
data. Cases are normally only known to the classifier producer 
software agents but not revealed to clinical users. In the tumour 
classification processes, the produced classifier software agents, as 
opposed to the specific cases are used for assisting diagnosis.  
3.2  Types of Patient Cases and Classifiers and 
Their Access Principles 
Although patient private data is protected by the link-anonymised 
data scheme and its exposure to users minimised by the 
classification mechanism, the system still may have to allow the 
direct access of patient records and this requires some access 
principles. The age and the gender of patients, for example, can be 
associated with tumour types and so may be useful for diagnosis. 
Thus, a contract signed between two clinical centres working 
closely with each other may allow some cases to be transferred 
between the two, but not a third party. Also, some classifiers may be 
trained internally for scientific experiments upon a specific set of 
data and the creators may not wish them to be accessible to the 
general public due to their applicability and reliability. These 
requirements demand the differentiating attributes of HealthAgents 
resources and their associated access principles. 
An anonymised patient case is associated with a status. The status of 
the patient case can be changed to, for example, validated. That is to 
say the patient diagnosis has been confirmed. The case can be 
public, being accessible by every HealthAgents node, or could 
remain  private, being only accessible by its owner node or for 
producing classifiers. A selection of the validated cases labelled as 
public at each site can be shared altogether to produce global 
classifiers which are always public. A node can also request the 
creation of local classifiers that are trained uniquely with its own 
public and private data as defined by the requesting user. Apart from 
the global and the local classifiers, a node may want to develop 
specific classifiers that are trained with all public cases available in 
the network in addition to its own private cases, being given a 
special weight to gain more accurate classification results for this 
particular site’s cases. Again, they can be defined by the requesting 
users as either public or private. Once a classifier is produced, no 
matter how it is produced and with what data, all the cases sent over 
from individual databases for training purposes will be discarded. 
The case data will only be temporarily stored in any other site apart 
from its origin. 
3.3  Legal and Ethical Obligations  
We have described the architecture of our d-DSS, the types of 
resources being used by it, and their associated access principles in 
previous sub-sections. We have analysed these against the UK Data 
Protection Act 1998 regulations listed in Section 1.2. The 
conformance to the Act can be briefly illustrated as follows. 
In the d-DSS, patient case records are only processed for either the 
diagnosis of that particular patient or for training classifiers, fairly 
and lawfully, this is in compliance with Principle 1. The publicity of 
a case and its direct access is strictly controlled by the node where 
the case is stored inside the HealthAgents network and the routine 
use of such data is replaced by classifiers which are trained upon the 
data by classifier training software. Thus, cases will not be 
processed in any manner in contradiction to the specified and lawful 
purposes of improving disease diagnosis as agreed by the patients 
and their exposure is minimised. This is in compliance with 
Principle 2. The adequacy, relevance, non-excessiveness, accuracy, 
and up-to-date status of cases are maintained by clinical centres and 
wherever possible, link-anonymised data is used for the preservation 
of patient privacy, this is in compliance with Principle 3 and 
Principle 4. All cases used for the purpose of training classifiers will 
be discarded when classifiers are produced and will not be kept for 
longer than it is necessary, this is in compliance with Principle 5. 
Patients retain the rights of withdrawing their cases and if requested 
they will be removed from the databases immediately (via the 
unique patient identifier being added to the link-anonymised data), 
this is in compliance with Principle 6. Each clinical centre enforces 
the described case access principles and so unauthorised or unlawful 
processing of personal data or damage to data will be avoided, this 
is in compliance with Principle 7. The HealthAgents project is 
building a network inside the EU boundary and may allow data 
transfer outside its network only if it is in a fully anonymised form 
and protected at an adequate level as being agreed upon, this is in 
compliance with Principle 8. 
4.  RESOURCE ACCESS CONTROL  
Although in the discussion of Section 3.3 we validated the existing 
infrastructure against the data protection regulations in the UK as 
stated in Section 1.2, engineering disciplines for security in Section 
1.1 must be equally respected in planning and implementing the 
proper set of security policies for network-wide resource access 
control. This is because the intended use of data as regulated by 
principles may be compromised when the system is abused or 
misused, by unauthorised people in unintended ways. Technical 
measures must be in place to prevent such access. This requires 
identifying methods that may result in the breaking of the so called 
CIA Triad: confidentiality, being concerned about unauthorised 
access to private information; integrity, being concerned about the creation, change, or deletion of data without authorisation; and 
availability, being concerned about the loss of control over the 
functioning system and its security measures.  
Fundamentally, the distributed nature of d-DSS should help to 
maintain the integrity amongst hospitals since individual centres can 
retain the control over their local patient cases and the policies for 
sharing them, the responsibility of overall data protection being 
spread. In addition, the distributed nature of d-DSS should improve 
availability with some built-in fault tolerance. When one node is 
down, requests for classification service can still be fulfilled due to 
multiple copies of classifiers being available across centres. 
Furthermore, the shift to classifier access from patient case access, 
which is now usually limited to the principle treating doctor and 
classification software, should help to improve the confidentiality of 
individual patient privacy. Nevertheless, some cases where the CIA 
Triad may be broken have been identified as follow. 
•  Theft and disclosure of patient privacy information by a hacker due to 
insecure transportation network – a confidentiality issue. 
•  Malicious users may create low quality classifiers – an integrity issue. 
•  Accidentally, inexperienced users may assign unreasonable reputation 
values to classifiers, such incorrect alteration of classifier reputation 
values will mislead diagnosis results – an integrity issue. 
•  Abuse of system services (Yellow Pages, Classifier Training, etc.) and 
so make them unavailable or even replace them with malicious 
alternatives and direct to wrong diagnosis – availability and integrity 
issues. 
•  Users from one hospital access data or execute classifiers from another 
hospital without the proper permission – confidentiality and integrity 
issues. 
In order to avoid such potential security breaches, the existing 
HealthAgents architecture should tackle some generic security 
requirements as outlined below. 
•  Secure encrypted message passing among HealthAgents nodes. 
•  Local site authentication. Appropriate policy sets application wherever 
resources are required across centres without requiring extra 
identification. 
•  Global resource and service policy sets at the overall HealthAgents 
level.  
•  Dynamic site addition to the HealthAgents network and trust 
relationship management, straightforward new policy sets deployment 
and minimum intervene to the existing infrastructure. 
•  Individual policy sets for access authorisation at local sites which retain 
their independent control over resources reside in their own site and 
these policies should override the global policy sets wherever a conflict 
occurs. 
•  Transparent user interaction without requiring them to be aware of the 
security measures, their access privileges being dynamically managed 
and maintained. 
Apart from secure communication and authentication, centred in 
these requirements is the access control over critical system 
resources. Resource access must be distinguished according to its 
sensibility and so access policies and handling procedures can be 
defined accordingly. Common security classification labels have 
been used widely, i.e. unclassified, sensitive but unclassified, 
confidential, secret, top secret. In the interest of HealthAgents, 
access levels can be classified for its resources under protection, in 
accordance with sensibility and confidentiality levels (from highest 
to lowest), as the following.  
0. Update a private patient record: often only available to the patient’s 
principle physician. 
1. Read a private patient record: also available to the producers of specific 
classifiers. 
2. Read a public anonymised patient record: available to classifier producers 
and under agreements to other hospitals in the HealthAgents network. 
3. Create a classifier: available to specific experienced clinicians with 
sufficient power who may allow the classifier producers to access required 
anonymised data and later set the publicity of the classifier. 
4. Update a classifier reputation: available to experienced clinicians who have 
executed that classifier upon a case and the accurate diagnosis result is known 
to them at that moment. 
5. Execute a local classifier: often available to local hospitals. 
6. Execute a global classifier: available to all hospitals in the HealthAgents 
network. 
7. Invoke a system service (Yellow Pages, etc.): may open even to hospitals 
outside of the HealthAgents network, this allows them to gain better 
knowledge of the available resources inside the network so they may want to 
join in later. 
These distinguished levels imply that the subjects of access can be 
categorised as individual users (level 0, 1 and 4), roles (level 3) and 
organisations (level 2, 5, 6, and 7). More restrictive permissions 
may be required. Access at level 5, for instance, may require a 
general open policy for an organisation to be restricted to an 
individual role or even a specific person for the use of a particular 
classifier.  In this case, more specific rules in addition to some 
general ones may be defined. Generalisation is also possible. A 
patient’s principle doctor, for example, may delegate the diagnosis 
to a specific trusted hospital, in a certain context. All these factors 
influence the building of a security model and the structure of policy 
rules. This will be described in Section 5.5. 
Message passing: resource request agentÆresource manager agent 
Resource or result of resource usage passing: resourceÆresource request 
agent 
Policy application: resource manager agent (apply policy set S with operation 
O upon resource R, sensibility level L) 
Follow-up operation: if success then: 
Figure 2. Symbols for expressing resource access control 
constructs within our cases.  
Resource access levels being specified in such a scheme, based on 
which security policy rules can be defined, the policies must be 
applied to enable the HealthAgents access processes. We have 
outlined such cases in Figure 3 where various access control policy 
sets (referring to Figure 1) can protect a variety of resources in 
various control flows. Figure 2 provides the minimum set of 
symbols for expression of such cases. These cases specify the 
security needs of major HealthAgents business functions, supported 
by the envisioned policy sets and associated access sensibility 
levelling. Based on the formalism, logic expressions will be later 
employed for formal specification and implementation, illustrated 
by using a comprehensive case in Section 5.5. 
Case 1 Execute a local classifier upon a local case. 
GUI Agent A Æ DB Agent A (apply Local data access policies A with read 
upon local case data, sensibility level 2) and GUI Agent A Æ Classifier 
Petitioner Agent A (apply Local classifier access policies A with execute 
upon local classifier, sensibility level 5) if success then: classification results 
Æ GUI Agent A 
Case 2 Execute an existing external classifier upon an already loaded 
case.  
GUI Agent A Æ Yellow Pages Agent A (apply Global resource and service 
policies with invoke upon query service, sensibility level 7) Æ Yellow Pages 
Agent B Æ Classifier Petitioner Agent B (apply Local classifier access 
policies B with execute upon global classifier, sensibility level 6) if success then: classification results Æ Classifier Petitioner Agent B (results being 
ranked) Æ Yellow Pages Agent B Æ Yellow Pages Agent A Æ GUI Agent 
A 
Case 3 Update a patient case record from a local site and the reputation 
of an employed classifier after diagnosis.  
GUI Agent A Æ DB Agent A (apply Local data access policies A with 
update upon local case data, sensibility level 0) and GUI Agent A Æ Yellow 
Pages Agent A (apply Global resource and service policies with update upon 
classifier reputation, sensibility  level 4)  if success then: success  Æ GUI 
Agent A 
Case 4 Build a new classifier using data sets distributed in another site. 
GUI Agent A Æ Training Petitioner Agent A (apply Local classifier building 
service policies A with invoke upon classifier building service, sensibility 
level 7) Æ Yellow Pages Agent A Æ Yellow Pages Agent B Æ DB Agent B 
(apply  Local data access policies B with read upon local case data, 
sensibility level 2) if success then: case data Æ Yellow Pages Agent B Æ 
Yellow Pages Agent A Æ Training Petitioner Agent A and if success then: 
produced classifier Æ Yellow Pages Agent A and if success then: success Æ 
GUI Agent A 
Figure 3. Major security-critical cases in HealthAgents.  
5.  THE SECURITY SOLUTION 
Security must cover three aspects for HealthAgents to fulfil the 
security requirements together. First of all, communication amongst 
clinical centres must be secured. This means that the contents of the 
messages being transported in the HealthAgents network which 
might contain patient privacy information or diagnosis results 
should not be intercepted or modified by eavesdroppers. One widely 
established techniques to resolve this problem is SSL. Java supports 
SSL connections among nodes by its key and certificate 
management tool. This same tool can be applied to set up secure 
links among distributed JADE containers. JADE-S, the extension 
package of JADE towards security also supports message-based 
signing and encrypting. This level of security ensures that messages 
passing in the network are safe but without concern of who is 
attempting to interact with the system. Authentication is, therefore, 
required at the next level of security. Only users with particular user 
names and passwords should be able to access the system. The Java 
Authentication and Authorisation Service (JAAS) provides a 
framework for user-based authentication. This is inherited by 
JADE-S. If it is assumed the previous two levels of security are in 
place, this will guarantee that only authenticated users can access 
the HealthAgents system and the communication among its 
distributed nodes is secure. Yet, users should only be able to access 
what they are allowed to with given permissions and nothing else. 
The last level of security should constrain the access control of the 
system, and only permit authorised operations to be performed upon 
critical system resources according to the security policies set by the 
administrative authority, as already discussed in the previous 
section. JADE-S inherits JAAS in this aspect for MAS and it is 
insufficient. This is because authorisation is business-dependent, 
but the actions JADE-S can permit or reject are specifically 
concerned with agents running in the JADE platforms, i.e. to create, 
send messages, or kill agents. Table 1 outlines these security levels.  
Table 1. Three major security levels 
  Principles  Protection  Techniques 
Secure 
communication 
(to be discussed 
in Section 5.1) 
All messages 
passing in the 
network should be 
securely signed and 
encrypted.  
Messages in 
transmission are kept 
secrete and unaltered, 
ensuring confidentiality 
and integrity. 
SSL, 
Public Key 
Infrastructure, 
JADE-S 
Authentication 
(to be discussed 
in Section 5.2) 
Users will be 
allowed to enter the 
system only if their 
identities are 
recognised.  
The one who claims to 
be of an identity has 
indeed that identity. No 
one can pretend to be 
someone else. 
JAAS  
Authorisation (to 
be discussed in 
Section 5.3) 
When resources are 
being requested, 
security policy 
rules, as set 
globally in the 
network, locally in 
hospitals, or 
individually by 
clinicians will be 
applied against the 
particular identity.  
Users can access or 
perform operations 
upon critical system 
resources only if they 
have been authorised to 
do so, their access 
permissions being 
bound with their 
identities recognised 
during authentication. 
Access control 
model and 
policy rules 
 
An example of combining these security levels is shown in Figure 4. 
A clinician from hospital 1 retrieves and classifies a case from 
hospital 2 using a classifier from hospital 4. In this scenario, he/she 
must be authenticated in hospital 1 before access to the local 
network, after which all messages passing through for the 
classification purpose in the interconnected HealthAgents network 
will be encrypted and the case requested from hospital 2 will be 
classified using the classifier requested from hospital 4, both access 
to resources being authorised. 
 
Figure 4. Overview of the security architectural levels using a 
cross-hospital resource access scenario.  
5.1  Secure Message Transportation  
Using the public key infrastructure (PKI) and digital signature, a 
secure communication protocol would be that the sender encrypts a 
message with a private key where the message is implicitly signed 
and on receipt of the message the receiver decrypts the message 
with the sender’s public key where its signature is verified. JADE-S 
provides in its API a security helper and signature and encryption 
services. Apart from these, we make use of Yellow Pages Agents 
for storing and managing public keys and establishing trust 
relationships. In a conversation involving multiple parties, only 
those agents who have been formally recognised and registered in 
the Yellow Pages after their starting up will be regarded trustworthy 
and Yellow Pages Agents are responsible for acknowledging the 
trusted parties in the network. Thus, they play the role of Certificate 
Authority (CA) in the sense that they assure the trustworthiness of 
communicating parties. Being an integral part of the framework, the 
use of Yellow Pages Agents for secure communication enables 
easier management and simpler communication. Figure 6 shows the 
class diagram of the agents we have developed in this level.  
Figure 6. A HealthAgent achieves secure message sending and 
receiving via two facilitating agents and two supporting services. 
a) In the beginning a HealthAgent in the network starts up, it needs 
to register itself in the YellowPagesAgent. The message of 
registerAgent must be signed so its identity can be checked and if 
recognised its principal (public key) will be added to the list of 
trustedPrincipals the YellowPagesAgent maintains.  
b) Then the HealthAgent uses the handleMessage in communication 
with other agents which are trusted within the network. It uses 
JadeMessagingService for sendMessage and receiveMessage, which 
involve a message encryption and decryption process performed in 
JadeSecurityService. 
c) When this HealthAgent attempts to send a message, 
JadeSecurityService will use its secureSendingMessage to check if 
the principal of the message receiver is in the trust list and if so, it 
will  sign and encrypt the message and send it on. Otherwise no 
message will be sent since (even secure) communication with agents 
outside of the network will endanger the system. 
d) When this HealthAgent receives a message, JadeSecurityService 
will use its secureReceivingMessage to check if the principal of the 
message sender is in the trust list and if so, it will decrypt the 
message and reply in signed and encrypted messages. Otherwise, if 
the message has not been signed or the signature is not recognised 
then the message will be discarded. 
e) In both above situations, we need JadeSecurityServiceAgent 
validatePrincipal of the communicating agent against the 
trustedPrincipals of YellowPagesAgent for JadeSecurityService at 
runtime. It maintains in its securityHelper internally the trusted 
principals (addTrustedPrincipal) and provides it to 
JadeSecurityService so it can check the principals of message 
senders and receivers (getPrincipal) against those trusted 
(getTrustedPrincipal) in secureSendingMessage and 
secureReceivingMessage. Moreover, this helper also encrypts 
messages (setUseEncryption) in the process of 
secureSendingMessage and gets message signatures and decrypts 
messages (getUseSignature and getUseEncryption) in the process of 
secureReceivingMessage.  
5.2  The Authentication Mechanism  
Establishing secure message passing among communicating parties, 
we can be sure that, in the scenario given in Figure 4, a Clinical 
User GUI Agent, a DB Agent, and a Classifier Petitioner Agent are 
all within the trusted domains and their communication will be 
secure. Note that this does not take into account who logs in and 
initialises such a conversation involving these parties for 
classification purposes and that user must be authenticated at the 
GUI Agent side, otherwise the established secure communication 
does not protect the system and become meaningless.  
A web-based GUI has been developed in HealthAgents for loading 
cases, performing classification, and presenting results. The 
associated GUI as currently in the prototype development stage 
assumes a single identical account for all user login and we intend to 
incorporate the JAAS authentication model into it for authentication. 
In the model, a user’s identity should be confirmed in authentication, 
represented by a subject seen in the model. A principal is granted to 
the user after his/her identity is verified during the authentication, 
being associated with a set of credentials. Such a principal is bound 
with a user identity to the GUI, while the principal of a GUI Agent 
is bound with an agent identity to the HealthAgents network as 
described in the previous subsection.  
A LoginModule performs the authentication, typically by prompting 
for and verifying a subject of his/her username and password. 
Several module implementations have been provided by JAAS and 
JADE-S and a special SimpleLoginModule allows very basic 
authentication. Alternative LoginModules can be loaded as 
configured in a Configuration file, being consulted by a 
LoginContext that can be instantiated from the GUI. LoginContext 
invokes a login method of the loaded LoginModule for 
authentication of subjects and upon success will associate principals 
and credentials with them. Principals of a subject can be later 
retrieved by invoking its getPrincipals method. JAAS policies can 
be configured for subjects and grant them authorised permissions 
following authentication. These can be later enforced by invoking 
doAs(subject,action) method, achieving the effect of having an 
action run as the subject. Those permissions, however, are centred 
on file or code access and are not of concern in HealthAgents. We 
will discuss in the next section the fine-grained access control 
mechanism to resources valued by HealthAgents based on the 
JAAS-authenticated subject principals. 
5.3  The Authorisation Mechanism 
Secure communication is guaranteed by identifying the principal of 
communicating sites and agents, and the secure interaction between 
users and the system is guaranteed by identifying the principal of 
the login users. Following these, as shown in Figure 4, the 
authenticated user should be able to access resources that he/she has 
been authorised. Authorising access to resources can be based on 
the identity of a principal, which may be mapped to unique roles for 
easier access control administration. Since the user principal is 
obtained in the previous authentication level, it should be passed on 
and encapsulated in following messages and available to the entire 
conversation (for classification, etc.). Then associated roles and 
groups can be looked up and applicable security policy rules 
enforced where the distributed system resources are accessed. 
Having been authenticated at the home site, the same principal will 
be reused for uniform authorisation across the centres. This supports 
successive security levels and provides a transparent user 
experience. 
In our previous work [9], we have developed a Security Model and 
an associated Policy Rule Model. Briefly, they borrow the role 
permission association from Role-Based Access Control [11], avoid 
its weaknesses, and extend it towards a seamless integration with the 
role playing pattern from Agent-Oriented Software Engineering. 
The security model sitting in MAS won’t let agents fulfil regular 
functional requirements unless security requirements are met. A role 
plays its functional duty if and only if its social constraints are 
satisfied. This scheme combines the social security role together 
with computation function role into an integrated role notion. This, 
therefore, achieves the separation of functional and non-functional requirements for easier management and maintenance but at the 
same time the two parts are integrated in the running system with 
unified agent playing behaviour according to the combined 
specification. The fundamental access permission rules take the 
following form with four major dimensions. 
{Subject (Id, Role, Organisation), Resource (Id, Type), Access 
Operation (Op), Access Context (Co)} 
This provides fine-grained access permission configuration based on 
individuals, roles, and organisations. A resource access request 
message can be identified to its origin and mapped to the roles that 
subject plays. Role based policies are easier for management but 
identity based policies allow customisation and exception. Policies 
can be defined in both forms. In HealthAgents, we have case 
records, classifiers, services (Yellow Pages, etc.), and their access 
must be protected by policies. Access operations should be 
distinguished for resources. One clinician may be able to execute a 
classifier but not update its reputation as differentiated in sensibility 
levels as discussed previously.  
Figure 7. Agent interaction model with security policy set application in HealthAgents. 
A context provides the flexibility to the model such as 1) allowing 
in particular situations certain specially delegated access in the 
name of a particular role; 2) providing justification of the special 
access; and 3) constraining the valid time period associated with the 
access. 
Several security-critical access cases have been described in Section 
4 and now a more comprehensive one involving all of them is used 
to demonstrate the application of the above policy rule scheme to 
meet the requirements described in that section. The case is a 
representative of most of the HealthAgents business functions as 
well as resource access flows. Briefly, the scenario is that a new 
hospital joins the HealthAgents network with a new MAS setup in 
that site, new clinician users wish to perform classification upon 
cases from there, and they do so by creating new classifiers for the 
purpose. The role interaction model (referring to Figure 7) can be 
described as follows, referring to Figure 1 for HealthAgents 
architecture and previous sections for supporting layers of secure 
communication and authentication.  
•  The new clinician is authenticated by JAAS via the local GUI Agent 
and his/her principal is bound with the interface for the entire 
interactive session (R1) 
•  The GUI Agent registers this new node via the YellowPagesAgent 
which recognises its identity (prior to this the local hospital manager 
may have to acknowledge the participation of the new site to the 
HealthAgents network administrator through conventional phone calls, 
R1 and R2) 
•  The YellowPagesAgent adds this new node to the trusted node list (R2) 
•  The GUI Agent at that node can start to communicate in the 
HealthAgents network and now it wants to perform a classification 
upon a local case (R3) 
•  The GUI Agent searches the YellowPagesAgent for available 
classifiers by sending questions to solve as the first message it 
initialises for a new conversation (R3 and R4) 
•  The YellowPagesAgent has its principal registered and it is in the 
trusted list so all ongoing communication in this conversation with all 
other agents will be allowed and all these messages will be signed and 
encrypted (R4) •  The YellowPagesAgent checks this GUI Agent against the permission 
of using its Yellow Pages query service and will perform the query to 
its registered classifiers but unfortunately no such classifier is available 
(R3 and R4) 
•  The GUI Agent requires the building of a new specific classifier 
(referring to Section 3.2 for definition) using distributed data sets (R5 
and R6) 
•  The TrainingPetitionerAgent applies a local policy repository and 
allows the request operation of building a new classifier (R6) 
•  Relevant public cases as well as local private cases from the request site 
will be sent to the building site for the production of the new classifier 
and data access policy rules will be applied before the data is sent from 
each site (R6 and R7, R6 and R8) 
•  A new classifier is produced and registered to the YellowPagesAgent, a 
copy becoming available to the original request site (R6 and R9) 
•  The clinician now wants to execute the new classifier upon the case 
when being informed of the availability of the classifier (R9 and R10) 
•  The local policy rules on the use of the classifier and the particular case 
will be applied against this specific clinician and he/she will be allowed 
to do the operation (R10 and R11, R10 and R12, R12 and R13) 
•  Decision making support is received from the results of the 
classification and a diagnosis will be made later on (R12 and R14) 
•  When an actual diagnosis result is known, the clinician wants to update 
the classifier reputation and the case he/she just diagnosed and the local 
policy rules on both operations will be applied against the clinician and 
he/she will be allowed to do so eventually (R14 and R15, R14 and R16) 
Figure 7 shows an interaction model that captures the interactive 
behaviour of involving agents each playing their respective roles, 
subject to the satisfaction of associated security policy constraints. 
The descriptive interaction behaviour which consists of message 
passing and constraint solving have been defined in Lightweight 
Coordination Calculus (LCC) [12] that can be transmitted, 
interpreted, and executed by agents in the network. The LCC 
language has been developed in the OpenKnowledge project [13] 
and it uses logic expression to regulate the message exchange 
protocols among participant peers each of which plays a particular 
role that dictates its particular message passing pattern in protocols. 
The following LCC clauses describe the fundamental interaction 
pattern for resource access control. 
a(resource_request, RRID) :: 
  request(Resource, Operation, Context) ⇒ a(resource_manager, RMID)  
a(resource_manager, RMID) :: 
  request(Resource, Operation, Context) ⇐ a(resource_request, RRID) ← 
grantPermission(RRID, Resource, Operation, Context, Policies) then ( 
    response(Grant_yes) ⇒ a(resource_request, RRID) or 
    response(Resource_result) ⇒ a(resource_request, RRID) ← 
getOperationResult(Resource, Operation, Access_result) ) 
Briefly, a(resource_request, RRID) :: DefRRID and 
a(resource_manager, RMID) :: DefRMID denotes that agents RRID 
and RMID play the roles of resource_request and resource_manager 
respectively as defined in the definitions follow. DefRRID has a 
single and DefRMID has a composite message passing behaviour 
constructed using the following forms: Defa  then Defb (Defa 
satisfied before Defb), Defa or Defb (either Defa or Defb satisfied), or 
Defa par Defb (both Defa and Defb satisfied). In the Def, Ml ⇒ Am 
denotes that a message Ml is sent to agent Am while Ml ⇐ A m 
denotes that a message Ml is received from agent Am. In the above 
role definitions, a message of resource access request is sent from 
the agent that plays the request role to the agent that plays the 
manager role. This appears equivalently as the first clause of two 
definitions as a message being sent or (expected to be) received for 
two communicating agents. Upon receipt of this message, the 
resource manager agent applies appropriate security policies and 
responds by sending back a message either saying the request has 
been granted (or rejected) or by providing the actual resources (or 
the results of their usage) being requested. In the Def, ←Consn 
denotes that a constraint must be satisfied (as some running code) 
before the clause prior to it. Two constraints have been used in the 
second role definition, one being used for policy rule sets evaluation 
and enforcement and another being used for the computation 
following the use of required resource sets. It has been assumed that 
all operations will be granted in the above interaction model for 
simplicity.  
In the following, we give the actual LCC clauses as the specification 
of the interaction model shown in Figure 7, concentrating on the 
resource access control procedures of case classification as well as 
case record and classifier reputation updating afterwards, in the 
interest of conciseness. The clinician role playing behaviour for 
resource access includes classification (R10) and updating of case 
record and classifier (R14). Its role changes when an accurate 
diagnosis result is known.  
/* R10: classify a local case using the new classifier just produced */ 
a(clinician_classify, CID) :: 
  classifierAvailable(C) ⇐ a(yellowpages_register, YPID) then 
  requestCaseRecordByID(I) ⇒ a(database, DBID) then 
  caseRecord (R) ⇐ a(database, DBID) then 
  requestClassification(R, C) ⇒ a(classifier_petitioner, CPID) then 
  classificationResults(S) ⇐ a(classifier_petitioner, CPID) then  
  a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID) 
/* R14: update case record and classifier reputation following diagnosis */ 
a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID) :: 
  ( updateCaseRecordByID(I) ⇒ a(database_update, DBID) then 
    caseRecordUpdated(Y) ⇐ a (database_update, DBID) )  
  par 
  ( updateClassifier(I) ⇒ a(classifier_petitioner, CPID) then 
    classifierUpdated(Y) ⇐ a (classifier_petitioner, CPID) ) 
A construct a(role, id) can represent a clinician with a unique 
identity who wants to play a certain function role, being associated 
with certain constraints. Only when the social rights roles assigned 
to that identity are permitted to access all resources involved in the 
function role playing behaviour, the compound role of that clinician 
can successfully complete the required requirements. To that end, 
his/her access must be controlled by the database agents and 
classifier petitioner agents before permissions are granted and 
functions carried out. The local database role playing behaviour for 
resource access control includes database issues a case record (R11) 
and updates the same record (R15). Different access control policy 
sets will be enforced in two situations.  
/* R11: send a case record for classification */ 
a(database_download, DBID) :: 
  requestCaseRecordByID(I) ⇐ a(clinician_classify, CID) ← 
grantPermission(CID, I, Read, Normal_classify_from_local_site, 
Local_database_read_policy_set) then 
  caseRecord(R) ⇒ a(clinician_classify, CID) ← getCaseRecordByID(I, R) 
then 
  a(database_update, DBID) 
/* R15: update a case record after classification */ 
a(database_update, DBID) ::   updateCaseRecordByID(I) ⇐ a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID) ← 
grantPermission(CID, I, Update, Normal_update_from_local_site, 
Local_database_update_policy_set) then 
  caseRecordUpdated (Y) ⇒ a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID) 
Being in compliance with the security policy schemes previously 
discussed, in every resource access request, the dimensions of 
(Resource, Operation, and Context) should be attached in addition 
to the identity of the requester. This identify can be extracted from 
the message being sent from the sender. Appropriate policy sets will 
be applied by respective resource manager agents (YellowPages 
Agent, Database Agents, Classifier Petitioner Agent, etc.). The 
constraint construct as part of the LCC language provides a solution 
that integrates the security constraints into the agent interaction 
protocols. These must be evaluated satisfactorily with a Boolean 
value of true returned once a resource request message is received 
and only then a response message can be sent back. A 
grantPermission method will be provided in the system that will be 
invoked for security policy application. 
grantPermission(ID RRID, Resource r, Operation o, Context c, PolicySet p) { 
logger.setAccessAudit(RRID, r, o, c, getTimestamp()); 
return applyPolicies(RRID, getRoleByID(RRID), r, o, c, p); …… } 
This offers audit points where each access can be later traced back, 
hence the audit-ability of sensitive resource access being enabled. 
The running and execution of LCC specification for agent 
interaction is supported by the OpenKnowledge kernel. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The unique security issues involved in healthcare domains have 
been discussed in this paper. The practical solution of these security 
issues have been addressed to the needs of the HealthAgents project. 
We believe a sustainable security solution should be provided in 
accordance with Software Engineering principles, and conform to 
ethical regulations for healthcare data, as well as fulfil the security 
requirements usually raised from distributed Decision Support 
System (d-DSS) due to the nature of clinical settings. 
Our work in these directions includes the design and development of 
security architecture in three levels. Various Software Engineering 
techniques are employed. We have developed or are in the process 
of developing in our system the secure communication to enable the 
protection of data transmission; authentication for user identity 
recognition; authorisation for fully customised resource access 
control. Using a security policy rule scheme and applying it in the 
interaction model for the HealthAgents MAS, we separate the 
functional and non-functional (security) requirements but let 
security policies integrate into the running of the agents in a 
distributed network via a unified role notion. Security policies 
enable easy and separate maintenance tasks across centres since 
they can be independently defined and maintained in each 
individual site but their application is yet under a unified access 
control scheme for resources with diverse types and locations. These 
make our security model adaptive. When a new hospital joins, new 
policy sets can be defined locally by the hospital managers. When 
its resources are required from other sites these policies will be 
applied by responsible manager agents residing in that site 
uniformly, conforming to the regulations set in that site. When its 
users require the access to resources from other sites, the external 
policies will be applied in the same manner where users and their 
assigned roles determine their access privileges. Once any policy 
rule is changed the  effect is immediate to all roles or individuals 
associated with the rule. Policies are automatically deployed and 
immediately available, requiring no coding and the minimum 
administrative overhead. The implementation work to fully achieve 
these goals is going on in our HealthAgents and OpenKnowledge 
projects. The work so far has established the basis for providing a 
comprehensive security model for distributed healthcare systems.  
Acknowledgements 
This work is supported under the HealthAgents and 
OpenKnowledge STREP projects funded by EU Framework 6 
under Grants: IST-FP6-027214 and IST-FP6-027253. 
7.  REFERENCES 
[1]  The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 1998. 
IEEE recommended practice for software requirements 
specifications. IEEE Std 830-1998. 
[2]  Bourque, P., Dupuis, R., Abran, A., Moore, J.W. and Tripp, 
L.L. 2005. Guide to the Software Engineering Body of 
Knowledge: 2004 Edition – SWEBOK. IEEE Computer 
Society. 
[3]  Gritzalis, D. and Lambrinoudakis, C. 2004. A security 
architecture for interconnecting health information systems. 
International Journal of Medical Informatics. 73, 3, 305-309. 
Elsevier. 
[4]  Choe, J. and Yoo, S. Web-based secure access from multiple 
patient repositories. International Journal of Medical 
Informatics. Elsevier. In press. 
[5]  Keese, J. and Motzo, L. 2005. Pro-active approach to malware 
for healthcare information and imaging systems. International 
Congress Series. 1281, 943-947. Elsevier.  
[6]  Szolovits, P. and Pauker, S.G. 1993. Categorical and 
Probabilistic Reasoning in Medicine Revisited. Artificial 
Intelligence. 59, 167-180. 
[7]  Coiera, E. 1994. Question the Assumptions. Knowledge and 
Decisions in Health Telematics - The Next Decade. 61-66. IOS 
Press. 
[8]  Kirn, S., Heine, C., Herrler, R. and Krempels, K.H. 2004. 
Agent.Hospital: A Framework for Clinical Applications in 
Agentcities. In Applications of Software Agent Technology in 
the Health Care Domain. 67-85. Birkhauser. 
[9]  Xiao, L., Peet, A., Lewis, P., Dashmapatra, S., Sáez, C., 
Croitoru, M., Vicente, J., Gonzalez-Velez, H. and Lluch i 
Ariet, M. 2007. An Adaptive Security Model for Multi-agent 
Systems and Application to a Clinical Trials Environment. In 
Proceedings of the 31st IEEE Annual International Computer 
Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC’07) 
Volume II. 261-266. IEEE Computer Society. 
[10] HealthAgents. http://www.healthagents.net/. 
[11] Sandhu, R.S., Coyne, E.J., Feinstein, H.L. and Youman, C.E. 
1996. Role-Based Access Control Models. Computer. 29, 2, 
38-47. IEEE Computer Society Press. 
[12] Robertson, D. 2005. A lightweight coordination calculus for 
agent systems. 183-197. LNCS 3476. Springer. 
[13] Robertson, D. et al. 2006. Open Knowledge: Semantic Webs 
Through Peer-to-Peer Interaction. OpenKnowledge Manifesto. 
http://www.openk.org/. 